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Introduction 
^ƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ  ?^ZD ? ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ  “the management of supply chain risk through 
coordination or collaboration among the supply chain partners so as to ensure profitability and 
continuity ? (Christopher and Lee, 2004). Supply chain risks can be viewed with respect to three broad 
perspectives; a  ‘ďƵƚƚĞƌĨůǇ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚƐĞŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞƐ ?ƌŝƐŬ events and the ultimate impact, 
the categorization of risks with respect to the resulting impact in terms of delays and disruptions and 
network based categorization in terms of local-and-global causes and local-and-global effects (Sodhi 
and Tang, 2012). 
 
The existing risk modelling techniques being applied in the domain of SCRM, mostly consider the risk 
events as independent and therefore, fail in capturing the interacting dynamic nature of risk factors. 
Furthermore, the risks associated with the conflicting incentives of supply chain stakeholders are not 
taken into consideration. Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a probabilistic graphical method that 
represents causal relationship between variables and captures uncertainty in dependency in terms of 
conditional probabilities (Sigurdsson et al., 2001, Fenton et al., 2007). BBNs have been used in 
modelling supply chain risks but mostly, the scope of such models has been limited to focussed areas 
like supplier selection, risk profiling, etc. (Lockamy III, 2011, Dogan and Aydin, 2011, Lockamy III and 
McCormack, 2012). Furthermore, the current BBN based models do not consider conflicting 
incentives among the stakeholders. 
 
Game theory is a study of strategic decision making. It assesses the risks associated with the 
conflicting incentives of various partners. It has been used in the conventional domain of supply 
chain management but its integration within the BBN based modelling of supply chain risks is 
considered to be a novel approach (Qazi et al., 2014). Game theory involves modelling various games 
as simultaneous-move games or sequential-move games (Nash, 1951). Game theory can capture the 
uncertainty associated with the information or belief of players represented as Bayesian games 
(Osborne, 2003). 
 
Research Problem and Contribution 
Supply chain risk management is an active area of research and a review of the literature reveals a 
gap between existing risk modelling techniques and their application to supply networks (Khan and 
Burnes, 2007). We propose a hybrid methodology integrating techniques of BBN and Game theory. 
BBNs can capture the interdependency between risk factors while Game theory can assess the 
conflicting incentives among stakeholders. tĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŝŶĞĚĂŶĞǁƚĞƌŵ  ‘'ĂŵĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐ ƌŝƐŬƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ
captures the risks associated with misaligned objectives of stakeholders in a supply chain. The 
methodology has been applied to a case study concerning the development of a new commercial 
aircraft. The proposed risk management model can help project managers visualize a holistic view of 
interdependent risk factors and select effective risk mitigation strategies. 
  
 
A Novel Framework for Supply Chain Risk Management 
We have developed a novel framework that captures the interaction between risk factors across the 
entire supply chain as shown in Figure 1. The risk management framework captures a holistic view of 
the risks associated with a supply chain. Following is the brief description of this framework: 
Risk Identification 
Risk identification involves identification of risk drivers, events and the consequences corresponding 
to each category of risks (upstream, process, downstream and external). We adopt the butterfly 
concept of risk (Sodhi and Tang, 2012). This stage of the risk management process also includes 
identification of control and mitigation strategies in place. 
Risk Assessment and Evaluation 
BBN models are constructed for each category of risks. Modelling a BBN comprises three broad 
stages of problem structuring, instantiation and inferencing (Sigurdsson et al., 2001). The sub-models 
for each category of risks are connected in relation to common triggers and consequences. Such 
modelling of the interaction between multiple risks makes this framework a more realistic 
abstraction of real time risks as opposed to the conventional risk registers that assume independency 
of the risk factors. The complete BBN model is instantiated and its inferencing results in the 
determination of significant risks, controls and mitigation strategies. 
Implementation of Controls/Mitigation Strategies 
Once the key risk drivers, controls and mitigation strategies are identified, these are implemented in 
order to achieve the objectives of the focal firm. 
Preparation for Future Unknown Risks  
Risk management is a closed loop process. The process must evolve in order to prepare for the future 
risk events. Therefore, risk management is a continuous and dynamic process that involves 
monitoring of the current risks and repeating the phases of risk management framework for the 
unknown risks arising in future. 
Application on Development Project of Boeing 787 Aircraft  
Development of Boeing 787 aircraft was a unique project in terms of its unconventional supply chain 
and the introduction of unproven technology (Tang et al., 2009). Boeing had outsourced more than 
70 percent of its production and development tasks and in order to reduce the financial risks, it relied 
on strategic partnership with Tier-1 suppliers. In this loss-sharing partnership, the Tier-1 suppliers 
would only receive their payment after successful culmination of the project. The management team 
of the project lacked expertise in supply chain risk management and therefore, the real time risks 
were not anticipated resulting in delay of the project by almost 3 years incurring huge financial 
penalty. 
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Game Theoretic Analysis 
In order to analyze the project through the lens of Game theory, we assume that all the Tier-1 
suppliers start their respective tasks at the same time and perform in parallel. Furthermore, the 
decision to keep or delay the schedule is taken once at the start of the task and therefore, holds good 
for the entire project. Boeing undertakes the assembly phase only after the completion of tasks by all 
the suppliers. Direct costs correspond to each task of the project including costs related to labour, 
material, shipping, etc. Indirect costs do not relate directly to the tasks but these are linked to the 
project duration. Overhead, delaying penalty, order cancellations and financial losses are some of the 
examples of indirect costs. A longer task is considered to lower direct costs while a longer project 
increases indirect costs (Nahmias, 2000). The variation of direct and indirect costs with task and 
project duration is shown in Figure 2. We consider games between two suppliers and Boeing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Game between Two Suppliers with Uncertainty regarding Project Completion 
In this game, we consider a situation in which both the suppliers are uncertain about the response of 
Boeing keeping in view delay incurred by one of the suppliers (or both). Therefore, in case of delay, a 
ŶŽĚĞ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ďǇ  ‘EĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŝƐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ  ‘r ? ĚĞŶŽƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŽĞŝŶŐ
expediting the project for timely completion as shown in Figure 3. The matrix form of the game is 
shown in Table 1. In a loss-sharing partnership between two suppliers and OEM, the suppliers may 
either delay (D) or keep (K) their tasks in time {as given in Equations ( 1 ) and ( 2 )} under following 
conditions: 
x All the players having complete knowledge of the cost functions of each other 
x The amount of penalty being greater than the saving resulting from delaying the task 
x ŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ‘r ?ƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŶƚŝŵĞ 
  ? െ ݎ ൏ ݏ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ݌௜ሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ׷ ܦܦ݅ݏݐ݄݁ݑ݊݅ݍݑ݁ܰܽݏ݄݁ݍݑ݈ܾ݅݅ݎ݅ݑ݉ ( 1 ) 
  ? െ ݎ ൒ ݏ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ݌௜ሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ׷ ܭܭܽ݊݀ܦܦܽݎ݁ܰܽݏ݄݁ݍݑ݈ܾ݅݅ݎ݅ܽ ( 2 ) 
 
Game between Two Suppliers with Uncertainty about Cost Function of Supplier 2 
In this game, we incorporate uncertainty about the cost function of a supplier. Supplier 1 knows 
about its pay-offs but cannot differentiate between the two types of Supplier 2; one having penalty 
function greater than the saving function (Type 1) while the other having converse of it (Type 2). 
Supplier 2 knows about the pay-offs of both of them. The matrix forms of the game between Supplier 
1 and each of the types of Supplier 2 are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
Figure 2 : Variation of direct and indirect costs with task and project duration respectively 
௜ܺ  
Cost of 
expediting 
ݏ௜  Direct
 c
o
st
 
Task duration   Ԣݔ௜ Ԣ 
ܿ௜  Saving from delaying 
݅ ൌ ൜ ݉ሺܤ݋݁݅݊݃ሻݏሺܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎሻ 
ܺ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ 
Penalty from 
delaying 
Project duration 
In
d
ir
e
ct
 c
o
st
 
Ԣݔ௦ ൅ ݔ௠Ԣ 
ݎ௜  ݌௜  
Reward of 
expeditin
g 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Supplier 2 
  D K 
S
u
p
p
li
e
r 
1
 
D 
࢙૚ሺ࢞૚ሻ െ ሼ૚ െ ࢘ሽሼ࢖૚ሺ࢙࢞ ൅ ࢄ࢓ሻሽǡ ࢙૛ሺ࢞૛ሻ െ ሼ૚ െ ࢘ሽሼ࢖૛ሺ࢙࢞ ൅ ࢄ࢓ሻሽ ݏଵሺݔଵሻ െ ሼ ? െ ݎሽሼ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻሽǡ െሼ ? െ ݎሽሼ݌ଶሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻሽ 
K 
െሼ ? െ ݎሽሼ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻሽǡ ݏଶሺݔଶሻ െ ሼ ? െ ݎሽሼ݌ଶሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻሽ ૙ǡ ૙ 
 
Table 1  ?DĂƚƌŝǆĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚŽĞŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ 
For this situation, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is defined as a triple of actions (Osborne, 2003); 
one for Supplier 1 and one for each type of Supplier 2, with the property that the action of Supplier 1 
is optimal, given the actions of the two types of Supplier 2 (as shown in Table 4) and the action of 
each type of Supplier 2 is optimal, given the action of Supplier 1. 
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Table 2 : Game between supplier 1 and type 1 of supplier 2  ? െ ݌ ׷  ݌ҧଶሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൏ ݏҧଶሺݔ௦ሻ 
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Table 3 : Game between supplier 1 and type 2 of supplier 2 
Nature 
r 
1-r 
 ?ǡ  ? 
െ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൅ ݏଵሺݔଵሻǡ െ݌ଶሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൅ ݏଶሺݔଶሻ 
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Figure 3  ?'ĂŵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽĞŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ 
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D െ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൅ ݏଵሺݔଵሻ െ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൅ ݏଵሺݔଵሻ െ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ൅ ݏଵሺݔଵሻ െ࢖૚ሺ࢙࢞ ൅ ࢄ࢓ሻ ൅ ࢙૚ሺ࢞૚ሻ 
 
Table 4 : Expected pay-offs of supplier 1 for each pair of actions of two types of supplier 2 
In a loss-sharing partnership between two suppliers and OEM, the suppliers may either delay or keep 
their tasks in time {as given in Equations ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 5 )} under following conditions: 
x A supplier having uncertainty about the cost function of other supplier 
x The amount of penalty being greater than the saving resulting from delaying the task for the 
supplier having incomplete information 
 ݌ ൒ ݏ ?ሺݔ ?ሻ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ׷ ሼܭǡ ሺܭǡ ܦሻሽܽ݊݀ሼܦǡ ሺܦǡ ܦሻሽܽݎ݁ܤܽݕ݁ݏܰܽݏ݄݁ݍݑ݈ܾ݅݅ݎ݅ܽ ( 3 ) 
 ݌ ൐ ݏ ?ሺݔ ?ሻ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ׷  ሼܭǡ ሺܭǡ ܦሻሽ݅ݏݐ݄݁ܲܽݎ݁ݐ݋݋݌ݐ݈݅݉ܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݅݋݊ ( 4 ) 
 ݌ ൏ ݏ ?ሺݔ ?ሻ݌ଵሺݔ௦ ൅ ܺ௠ሻ ׷  ሼܦǡ ሺܦǡ ܦሻሽ݅ݏݐ݄݁ݑ݊݅ݍݑ݁ܤܽݕ݁ݏܰܽݏ݄݁ݍݑ݈ܾ݅݅ݎ݅ݑ݉ ( 5 ) 
 
Bayesian Belief Network Analysis 
We developed cognitive maps based on the qualitative case studies published in peer-reviewed 
journals. This was followed by the construction of three BBN models comprising the oversimplified 
ŵŽĚĞů ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŽĞŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĞĂů ƚŝŵĞ ŵŽĚĞů ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ
integrated model of all the risks including game theoretic risks. The models were populated on the 
basis of publically available statistics and the judgement of two of the researchers having expertise in 
aviation industry. The application of our developed framework on the Boeing 787 project is shown in 
Figure 4.  
The model clearly illustrates the interdependency between risk triggers, events and consequences. 
Controls can be devised to inhibit the probability of the occurrence of a risk event while mitigation 
strategy helps reducing the impact of the resulting consequence. Such a model can help decision 
makers visualize the dynamics of interacting risk factors in order to take well-informed decisions. The 
comparison of three developed models is tabulated in Table 5. Boeing was over optimistic in 
considering the probability of development cost and time exceeding the expectation being as low as 
0.22 and 0.09 respectively. Once the interdependency of risks was considered (excluding game 
theoretic risks), the relevant probabilities increased to 0.79 and 0.76 respectively. However, the 
incorporation of game theoretic risks made the project vulnerable to major delays augmenting the 
probabilities to the highest values of 0.81 and 0.98 respectively. 
Conclusion 
 
There is a research gap concerning application of existing risk quantification techniques in the field of 
supply chain risk management. We have developed a comprehensive risk management framework 
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Model 
Probability of 
development cost 
(high) 
Probability of 
development time 
(exceeding schedule) 
ŽĞŝŶŐ ?Ɛ perceived model  
(ignoring interdependency between risks) 
0.22 0.09 
Real model capturing interdependency 
between risks excluding game theoretic risks 
0.79 0.76 
Real model capturing interdependency 
between risks including game theoretic risks 
0.81 0.98 
 
Table 5 : Comparison of various models developed for Boeing 787 Project 
that integrates two techniques of Bayesian belief network and Game theory. The novel framework 
captures interdependency between risk factors including the Game theoretic risks. We have applied 
our framework on development project of Boeing 787 aircraft. The three developed models have 
been compared against the quantification of risks and the model incorporating the dynamic 
interaction of risks including game theoretic risks, projects most reliable estimation of risks. The 
game theoretic modelling of the behavioural aspects of stakeholders reveals their conflicting 
incentives in terms of the choice of delaying strategy against timely completion of the project. 
Integrating the interdependency between risk drivers, events and consequences helps modelling and 
managing risks in a holistic manner for better decision making. 
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